Contested frontiers: indigenous mobilization and control over land and natural resources in Myanmar's upland areas by Einzenberger, Rainer
www.ssoar.info
Contested frontiers: indigenous mobilization
and control over land and natural resources in
Myanmar's upland areas
Einzenberger, Rainer
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Einzenberger, R. (2016). Contested frontiers: indigenous mobilization and control over land and natural resources
in Myanmar's upland areas. ASEAS - Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 9(1), 163-171. https://
doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2016.1-10
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Forschungswerkstatt ^  Research Workshop
Contested Frontiers: Indigenous Mobilization and Control 
over Land and Natural Resources in Myanmar's Upland 
Areas
Rainer Einzenberger
► Einzenberger, R. (2016). Contested frontiers: Indigenous mobilization and control over land and natural 
resources in Myanmar’s upland areas. ASEAS -  Austrian Journal o f  South-East Asian Studies, 9(1), 163-172.
Over the past two decades, Myanmar’s upland areas have gradually turned into formally 
administered, legible, and governable state-territory. Following decades of armed con­
flict, a series of ceasefire agreements since the 1990s opened the door for the central 
state’s expansion of territorial control in the upland areas through the exploitation of 
natural resources and land concessions. New civil society coalitions are being formed 
inside Myanmar to resist the states strategy of accumulation by dispossession in conjunc­
tion with enclosures and the formation of state territory. This paper provides a brief out­
line of an ongoing research project which takes a socio-spatial perspective on state build­
ing processes and links the concept of the resource frontier with emerging discourses on 
indigenous rights in Myanmar.
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INTRODUCTION
This contribution provides an outline of an ongoing research project in its early 
stage. Against the backdrop of current political and economic transformation 
processes in Myanmar, the research takes a socio-spatial perspective on state 
building in the periphery or frontier areas, that is, the vast upland areas along 
its borders. The project aims to investigate the practices (technologies), strate­
gies, and discourses of different actors to produce frontiers in ceasefire areas of 
Myanmar’s uplands through the integration into state territory and the national 
(capitalist) economy. Furthermore, I seek to understand how actors on different 
scales respond to the extension and production of state space in the frontier ar­
eas and the corresponding processes of enclosures of land and natural resources. 
The first part of this article provides some (historical) background on the for­
mation of Myanmar’s resource frontiers. After a brief outline of the theoretical 
framework, some preliminary insights are discussed.
STATE BUILDING AND THE RESOURCE FRONTIER IN MYANMAR
Myanmar’s upland areas -  inhabited by over 40% of the country’s population and 
covering about 50 to 60% of its territory -  are among the most ethnically diverse 
and resource-rich regions in Southeast Asia (Buchanan, Kramer, & Woods, 2013;
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Food Security Working Group, 2011). With many armed ethnic groups still fighting 
the central government, these frontier areas became notorious for the world’s longest 
running civil wars (South, 2008, 2011). In October 2015, a national ceasefire agree­
ment was signed just before the general elections. Yet, it was neither a national agree­
ment (since only a few armed groups signed it), nor did it end all hostilities (Ye Mon 
& Lung Min Mang, 2015).
According to Scott (2009), the upland areas -  now officially part of Myanmar state 
territory -  were part of a vast non-state space which he termed Zomia.1 Encompass­
ing the uplands of mainland Southeast Asia and Southwest China, Zomia provided 
a sanctuary for diverse groups of people who wanted to evade state building projects 
in the valleys. However, since the second half of the 20th century Zomia has ex­
perienced major transformations, described as the “last enclosure” (Scott, 2009, p. 
10): “The sovereign nation-state is now busy projecting its power to its outermost 
territorial borders and mopping up zones of weak or no sovereignty” (Scott, 2009, 
p. xii). Under British colonial rule, Burma’s uplands (then also called “frontier areas” 
or “excluded areas”) were politically divided from the lowlands (“Burma proper”) and 
put under different systems of administration (Seekins, 2006; Taylor, 2009; Thant 
Myint-U, 2001). After independence from the British Empire in 1948, large parts of 
these upland areas remained under the control of traditional rulers and headmen 
(Smith, 1991). A failed attempt to integrate the frontier areas into the Union of Burma 
during a brief democratic period resulted in the outbreak of several revolts by ethnic 
armed groups and communist insurgents. In 1962, General Ne Win staged a military 
coup and declared the country a Socialist State run by a military government and 
later the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) (Seekins, 2006). What followed was a 
violent period of war-induced state building (Callahan, 2003).
The situation in the frontier areas changed profoundly following the nationwide 
pro-democracy uprising in 1988 and the collapse of the Communist Party o f  Burma 
and its armed resistance in 1989 (Seekins, 2006). After the violent oppression of the 
uprising, the new regime changed its name (State Law and Order Restoration Council, 
SLORC) and its strategies from the early 1990s onwards. Deals with major armed 
ethnic groups were brokered, offering legal concessions for the extraction of natural 
resources and other lucrative business in the frontier zones in return for ceasefire 
agreements (Jones, 2014; Schaffar, 2008; Woods, 2011). The ceasefires “weakened and 
co-opted much of the opposition” (Jones, 2014, p. 780) and allowed the military re­
gime to re-focus on its major political reform in the center and layout a roadmap for 
a ‘disciplined democracy’ to safeguard its interests (Jones, 2014). This finally led to 
the adoption of the 2008 Constitution (introducing a nascent federal system) and the 
implementation of the 2010 general elections (and subsequent 2015 elections) which 
set the stage for a semi-democratic government under strong military control (Kyaw 
Yin Hlaing, 2012).
Alongside its ceasefire strategy, the junta abandoned its ‘Burmese Way to Social­
ism’ in favor of a ‘Burmese Way to Capitalism’ and adopted a market-oriented open- 
door policy to enlarge its economic base and maintain its power (Mya Maung, 1995).
1 The term Zomia was originally coined by Willem Van Schendel (2002) and refers to Zomi which is 
translated as highlander. The term is also used as an endonym by some groups in the Western uplands of 
Myanmar, however, the exact translation is contested (Vumson, 1986).
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The valuable resources in Myanmar’s frontier regions (e.g., timber, jade, rubies, min­
erals, water resources) as well as its ‘maritime frontier’ -  rich in natural gas fields 
-  played an important role in securing foreign exchange. According to official data, 
recent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Myanmar has been concentrated in the 
oil/gas and hydropower sectors followed by the mining sector (Allan & Einzenberger, 
2013). The military government began to export natural gas to Thailand in the late 
1990s with the construction of the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines.
Another pipeline from Myanmar to China was completed in 2013, increasing the 
export revenues from oil and gas sales (Shwe Gas Movement, 2013). Recent reports 
suggest that the oil and gas sector payments contributed around 40% of the esti­
mated government fiscal revenues in 2013/2014 (Bauer, Shortell, & Delesgues, 2016). 
However, unofficial reports place the value of mineral exports even higher than those 
of oil and gas. Officially reported at USD 1.5 billion (Moore Stephens LLP, 2015), an in­
dependent Global Witness report values the jade production in Myanmar up to USD 
31 billion in 2014 alone (Global Witness, 2015, p. 5). This would amount to almost half 
of Myanmar’s GDP in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). Jade is almost exclusively exported to 
China, most of it informally (Global Witness, 2015). Other major minerals produced 
and exported are copper, lead, silver, zinc tin, tin-wolfram, and coal (Moore Stephens 
LLP, 2015). Furthermore, the export of timber from the frontier areas still provides 
an important source of revenue which amounted up to an estimated USD 1.5 billion 
in 2013 (Woods, 2015, p. iii). According to Mya Maung (1995), the willingness of the 
neighboring countries to invest in Myanmar and exploit its rich resources was “the 
single most important factor that has helped the junta to rule against the will of the 
Burmese people” (pp. 678-679). The frontier regions provided theses rich resources.
The political transition after the 2010 general elections and the inclusion of the 
main opposition party -  the National League fo r  Democracy (NLD) -  in the political 
process paved the way for the further opening of Myanmar’s economy following the 
lifting of international economic sanctions (Jones, 2013). Termed the “last frontier” 
by international business pundits (Kent, 2012), Myanmar has become a new invest­
ment opportunity for transnational capital. The “highly rapacious and coercive” 
(Jones, 2013, p. 167) mode of capitalist development continues to focus largely on 
resource extraction in the ethnic frontier areas with significant environmental and 
social impacts (Buchanan et al., 2013). Investor-friendly legislation adopted by the 
semi-civilian government since 2012 such as the FDI law and new land laws (Buchan­
an et al., 2013; Ferguson, 2014; Transnational Institute, 2014) facilitate a new regime 
of accumulation which is mainly based on enclosures and dispossession (De Angelis, 
2001; Glassman, 2006; Sevilla-Buitrago, 2015). According to some critical voices, “in­
digenous people’s practices of customary laws and use of local common natural assets 
are mostly disregarded. Indigenous peoples are increasingly driven off their common 
land and further marginalized” (Myo Ko Ko, 2014). Customary ways of land use and 
agriculture such as shifting cultivation and the use of natural commons (e.g., com­
munity forests, water resources, communal land) are mostly ignored in government 
policies. Current state policies prioritize formal land titles and private property in 
accordance with the policies of modern capitalist economies (Buchanan et al., 2013; 
Cairns, 2015; Transnational Institute, 2014).
166 Rainer Einzenberger ^  ASEAS 9(1)
FRONTIER, STATE BUILD ING, AND INDIGENEITY
The research project employs the concept of frontier as an analytical framework to 
capture the process of (capitalist) state expansion through territorial control and re­
sultant contestations in the periphery. Originating from historical studies (Turner, 
1921), the concept has been adjusted and applied in social sciences in recent years to 
explain conditions at the “fuzzy edges” (Geiger, 2009, p. 195) of states (Barbier, 2010; 
Fold & Hirsch, 2009; Kelly & Peluso, 2015). Peluso and Lund (2012) understand fron­
tiers as spaces “where authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past 
have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, territorializations and 
property regimes” (p. 669). Geiger (2009) calls this process the “politics of nationaliz­
ing space” (p. 195). Yet, the frontier concept cannot sufficiently explain the underlying 
mechanisms of state building or the ‘nationalization of space’.
A pioneering work interrogating the relationship between states, (socially pro­
duced) space, and territory was laid out by Lefebvre (1991). According to him, space 
is socially produced, that is, space has a material as well as a social and discursive 
dimension that is linked to specific societies and modes of production. The capital­
ist nation state produces a very particular space that is different from non-capitalist 
spaces or non-state spaces. It is an abstract space that is homogenous and devoid of 
any difference. Abstract space enables the process of capital accumulation and privi­
leges the exchange value over the use value. It is instituted by the state and is a politi­
cal instrument towards territorial control (Lefebvre, 2009, p. 187). For Lefebvre, the 
production of social space is an inherently political and contested act.
Whereas the state and capital attempt to ‘pulverize’ space into a manageable, 
calculable and abstract grid, diverse social forces simultaneously attempt to 
create, defend or extend spaces of social reproduction, everyday life and grass­
roots control (autogestion). (Brenner & Elden, 2009 , p. 367)
Following the work of Lefebvre, Poulantzas (1978/2000) has examined in his state 
theory the interrelation of global and national capitalist expansion and the produc­
tion of state frontiers. He considers the frontier as the very space where the state 
inscribes its “spatio-temporal matrix” in order to extend the reproduction of capital 
and the separation of labor and capital (p. 116). The nation state monopolizes the 
organization of state space and seeks to homogenize it and its inhabitants in order 
to unify the national market and economy (Poulantzas, 1978/2000, p. 107). However, 
the state is not a homogenous actor or institution but a social relation or a strategic 
terrain where social classes compete for power and control over resources (Poulant- 
zas, 1978/2000, p. 73). These power relations between certain classes, class fractions, 
and power blocks are materialized amongst others within the state, its infrastruc­
ture, and its apparatus. Thus, by analyzing the conflicting spatial strategies and socio- 
spatial relations between different actors, it is also possible to unravel ongoing state 
building processes. The concept of indigeneity provides a useful analytical category 
in order to grasp these conflicting dynamics around state building processes at the
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margins of states.2 While looking onto a long political tradition in the Americas, 
the concept of indigeneity as a political and legal tool has slowly gained traction in 
Southeast Asia in recent years (Erni, 2008; Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 2011; Li, 2010). Since 
important elements of indigeneity are the attachment to ancestral territories as well 
as the idea of self-determination, the concept serves as a suitable collective resis­
tance identity in the context of contested territories in the frontier areas (Baird, 2011; 
Castree, 2004; Erni, 2008). Despite its strong linkage to the local scale, the idea of 
indigeneity has also a strong transnational dimension. It is directly linked to UN in­
stitutions such as the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) 
as well as international legal standards such as the UN Declaration on the Rights o f  
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (MIPENN, 2015).
PRELIM INARY RESULTS
The upland areas of Myanmar can be conceptualized as resource frontiers at the fore­
front of an ongoing process of state building. This process goes hand in hand with 
the formation of capitalist state spaces through the production of abstract space. The 
internationalization and economic transformation of the Myanmar state in recent 
years and its accumulation strategy based mainly on the enclosure of land and the 
extraction of resources are the main drivers for the creation of these frontiers. Ini­
tial explorative research has shown the growing importance of indigeneity as a new 
political discourse and platform for certain civil society actors in the current politi­
cal and economic context of Myanmar.3 This can be seen as a direct response to the 
enclosures of land in the frontier areas on the one hand and to the gradual opening 
of political space on various scales on the other hand. It also constitutes a change 
from the past, when “ethnic identity was generally not expressed in terms of broader 
international standards on indigenous peoples’ rights” (MCRB, IHRB, & DIHR, 2014, 
p. 132). Even though little direct reference to indigenous peoples is made in domestic 
legislation and the term is not yet widely used, ethnic civil society advocates increas­
ingly identify themselves as ‘indigenous’. They do not identify as (national or ethnic) 
minorities but as indigenous peoples in order to reinforce their legitimate claim to 
the lands and their right for self-determination. This political struggle has been a key 
and continuous demand since the beginning of the state building project. Several 
indigenous organizations and coalitions have been formed in recent years such as the
2 There is no universal agreement on the definition o f indigenous peoples. Jose R. Martinez Cobo, the 
former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, outlined some elements relevant for identifying indigenous peoples: occupation of ancestral 
lands; common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; culture; language; residence on cer­
tain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world. O n an individual basis, an indigenous person 
is one that belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification as indigenous (group con­
sciousness) and is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the 
group) (Myanmar Indigenous Peoples/Ethnic Nationalities Network [MIPENN], 2015, p. 1)
3 While the term indigenous peoples (tha-nay tain-yin-tha in Burmese language) “is not widely under­
stood or generally used in Myanmar . . . indigenous rights activists use the Burmese term hta-nay tain-yin- 
tha for indigenous peoples, and base themselves on the international concept of indigenous, using the 
criteria o f non-dominance in the national context, historical continuity, ancestral territories, and self­
identification” (Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business [MCRB], Institute for Human Rights and Busi­
ness [IHRB], & The Danish Institute for Human Rights [DIHR], 2016, p. 13)
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Myanmar Indigenous Peoples/Ethnic Nationalities Network (MIPENN, 2015), the Coali­
tion o f  Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma, and others.
They comprise of a number of ethnic civil society organizations as well as cultural 
and environmental non-governmental organizations who see an advantage in orga­
nizing under the umbrella of indigeneity. The latter submitted a report to the 23rd 
session of the Universal Periodic Review Working Group at the UN in Geneva in No­
vember 2015, highlighting the major concerns for indigenous peoples in Myanmar. 
The most pressing concerns were related to access to land, territory, and resources 
as well as cultural rights (Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma, 2015; 
Yen Snaing, 2015). While highlighting specific cases of land confiscation and extrac­
tive industry projects in frontier areas, the report asks for “domestic legislation to en­
sure that it incorporates the collective rights of indigenous peoples to their land, ter­
ritories, and natural resources, including customary land use practices” (Coalition of 
lndigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma, 2015, p. 14). Ongoing advocacy and lobbying 
with the government has already achieved some initial results. The 2015 Protection 
o f  the Rights o f  National Races Law4 states that “prior to implementing development 
projects and . . . extracting of natural resources, local indigenous inhabitants are to be 
informed and be explained in detail about these plans and projects to achieve mutual 
cooperation” (Article 5, cited in MIPENN, 2015, p. 35). This relates to the concept of 
Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) which is an important element of the UND­
RIP. In several rounds of negotiations concerning the hotly debated National Land 
Use Policy, indigenous rights advocates also managed to integrate the recognition of 
“customary lands” and “customary land use tenure systems” into the latest draft (MI­
PENN, 2015, p. 41). Several civil society organizations are active in raising awareness 
on UNDRIP, FPIC, and the National Land Use Policy draft, and conduct participa­
tory community mapping in order to maintain grassroots control over community 
territory, land, and resources. This clearly illustrates the agency of indigenous move­
ments in Myanmar. It also resembles similar developments in other countries in the 
region, such as Cambodia and Indonesia (Baird, 2011; Hall et al., 2011). In order to 
gain further insights into struggles for control over land and natural resources more 
empirical research is needed, also focusing on selected cases studies on a local and 
regional scale.
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